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THE IMPACT OF E-SERVICE ON E-MAIL USERS EVERYWHERE
I.

INTRODUCTION

For the weary plaintiff burdened with the difficult task of serving an elusive
defendant, Internet platforms1 provide an ideal solution: compose a brief message,
attach a PDF document, and press send. Although the practice is still in its infancy,
a growing body of case law supports using e-mail and social media to effect service
of process.2 This manner of service is sometimes referred to as “e-service,”3 and legal
commentators have been forecasting its emergence for nearly two decades.4
Unfortunately, e-service may have unintended consequences on e-mail users.
Spam e-mail attacks pose a significant threat to users’ sensitive information, and
messages that carry a legal obligation to open an e-mail attachment serve as an ideal
template for such attacks.5 Without safeguards, such as an independent way to
determine authenticity, individuals who receive such messages will be unable to tell
if an attachment is fraudulent until it is too late.6 Many individuals will be at risk of
1.

Here, the phrase “Internet platforms” refers to e-mail and social media. However, this note focuses
primarily on the former, since e-mail poses a greater risk of spam attacks. Although social media is not
immune to spam attacks, such attacks are more easily contained on social media because users can often
view a sender’s profile before opening a message and can set their privacy settings to allow messages
only from individuals they have already added as “friends.” See, e.g., Managing Messages: Which Messages
Will I Receive on Facebook?, Facebook Help Ctr., https://www.facebook.com/help/336759363070078
(last visited Apr. 6, 2017) (indicating that messages from individuals who are friends with the user on
Facebook will be sent directly to the user’s inbox, whereas messages from other individuals will be
displayed as “message requests”). But see Phishing: What Can I Do About Phishing?, Facebook Help
Ctr., https://www.facebook.com/help/217910864998172 (last visited Apr. 6, 2017) (indicating that
accounts can be “hacked” if users provide their login credentials to a fake Facebook login page).

2.

See infra text accompanying notes 34–51.

3.

As used herein, the phrase “e-service” is limited to the method of serving process—serving originating
documents such as summons and complaint—via e-mail or social media message without the recipient’s
consent. See Snyder v. Alternate Energy Inc., 857 N.Y.S.2d 442, 443 (Civ. Ct. 2008); Jeremy A. Colby,
You’ve Got Mail: The Modern Trend Towards Universal Electronic Service of Process, 51 Buff. L. Rev. 337
(2003) (using the phrase “electronic service” throughout); Kevin W. Lewis, Comment, E-Service:
Ensuring the Integrity of International E-Mail Service of Process, 13 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 285
(2008) (using the phrase “e-service” in the title, but “e-mail service” throughout); Andriana L. Shultz,
Comment, Superpoked and Served: Service of Process Via Social Networking Sites, 43 U. Rich. L. Rev.
1497, 1512 (2009) (using the phrase “e-service of process”). However, this phrase is also generally used
to refer to the consensual exchange of documents and notices, including pleadings, between parties of a
lawsuit. See, e.g., Colo. R. Civ. P. 121, § 1-26(1)(d).

4.

See Colby, supra note 3, at 337, 381–82 (noting a trend toward e-service and predicting that it will
eventually become standard practice, as opposed to an exception); Yvonne A. Tamayo, Are You Being
Served?: E-mail and (Due) Service of Process, 51 S.C. L. Rev. 227, 246–54 (2000) (discussing the use of
electronic technology by the courts and advocating for courts to allow e-service); Frank Conley, Comment,
:-) Service with a Smiley: The Effect of E-mail and Other Electronic Communications on Service of Process, 11
Temp. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 407, 412, 414, 427–28 (1997) (noting that nothing in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure bars e-service, that e-mail has been widely accepted in society, and advocating for e-service).

5.

See infra text accompanying notes 54–61.

6.

Although some e-mail platforms allow a user to preview an attachment before opening it, all a spammer
would have to do to successfully mislead a user is create a document that appears legitimate at first
glance. Also, although many e-mail platforms automatically scan attachments for malware, they do not
always identify malware ahead of time. See infra text accompanying notes 62–66.
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identity theft as they must choose between opening a (perhaps dangerous) attachment
and ignoring a message, which may be perfectly legitimate, altogether.7 If they do
the former, they can be exposed to malware and spyware, but if they do the latter,
they can face unknown legal consequences.8 Further, as e-service becomes more
common, fraudulent e-service messages will appear more legitimate and will have a
higher chance of deceiving recipients.9
This note consists of five Parts, and ultimately proposes three solutions to the
problems that e-service presents. Following this Introduction, Part II surveys the
jurisprudence of e-service, including the constitutional limitations on alternate
service of process. Part III discusses technology, focusing on the current state of
malware (software that can have a harmful impact on a user’s computer) and spyware
(software that monitors user activity and can secretly transmit personal information).
Part IV examines the legal implications of failing to respond to personal service
under New York and federal law, and submits that all e-mail and social media users
currently have, at least as a practical matter, a duty to open any message that appears
to contain pleadings, even if they have no reason to suspect they are being sued.
Part V proposes three possible solutions to the problems that e-service creates, and
acknowledges the inherent limitations of each. First, jurisdictional rules should
mandate that an index number, or other document identifier,10 be included in the
body of an e-service message. This would enable all recipients to safeguard their hard
drives by ensuring the message is legitimate before opening its attachments.11 Second,
a policy should be imposed whereby defendants are freely allowed to vacate default
judgments obtained through e-service and defend on the merits if they can establish
that they either did not check their messages or that they saw the message, but had no
reason to believe it was legitimate.12 This would help prevent the emergence of a legal
obligation to routinely check one’s e-mail and social media accounts, and encourage
plaintiffs to compose e-service messages so that they appear as authentic as possible to
the recipient.13 Third, either courts or the legislature should establish a uniform list of
elements that must be present for e-service to be utilized.14 By creating a clear and
7.

This dilemma is discussed infra Part IV.

8.

See infra text accompanying notes 71–94.

9.

See infra Part III.

10.

This note uses the phrase “document identifier” to refer to a piece of information that allows a user to
verify that the document has been filed with the appropriate court. The importance of placing such an
identifier in the body of an e-mail cannot be understated, since it would allow the recipient to verify the
document without opening the attachment, which would substantially decrease the threat of
downloading spyware. See discussion infra pp. 467–68. A document identifier could be an index or
docket number, which recipients could use to obtain a copy of the initiatory documents through the
court system.

11.

See discussion infra pp. 467–68.

12.

See discussion infra p. 469.

13.

See discussion infra p. 469.

14.

See discussion infra pp. 469–70.
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definitive rule, individuals (and their attorneys) could precisely evaluate whether they
have a legal obligation to open e-service attachments.
II. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF E-SERVICE

Due process of law requires that individuals be given a fair opportunity to defend
themselves in an adjudicatory dispute.15 Among other things, this necessitates that a
defendant be afforded a reasonable opportunity to receive notice of an impending
lawsuit.16 Therefore, at a minimum, an individual seeking judicial action must
reasonably attempt to notify the opposing party.17 The Constitution does not require
actual notice; all that is required is an attempt that is reasonably calculated to give
actual notice and not substantially less effective than available traditional methods.18
Such an attempt is a formality known as “service of process,” or “service.”19 Once

15.

See Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 672 (1996) (“[T]he core function of service is to supply
notice of the pendency of a legal action, in a manner and at a time that affords the defendant a fair
opportunity to answer the complaint and present defenses and objections.”); Grannis v. Ordean, 234
U.S. 385, 394 (1914) (“The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.”).

16.

See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (“Th[e] right to be heard has
little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself
whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest.”); Shultz, supra note 3, at 1499 (stating that notice
has been a prerequisite to legal action for over 4,000 years (citing Reuven Yaron, The Laws of
Eshnunna, 118–19 (2d rev. ed. 1988))).

17.

Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314–15 (“An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,
to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections. The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information,
and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance. . . . The means
employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to
accomplish it.” (citations omitted)).

18.

Id. at 315 (“The reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of any chosen method may be
defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those affected, or, where
conditions do not reasonably permit such notice, that the form chosen is not substantially less likely to
bring home notice than other of the feasible and customary substitutes.” (citations omitted)); id. at
317–20 (contrasting the propriety of notice by publication for defendants whose addresses are unknown
with the impropriety of such service for defendants whose addresses are known, in light of the ability of
ordinary mail to reach those of the latter type); see also Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 170–
73 (2002) (applying Mullane and rejecting the assertion that due process required, as a “feasible
substitute,” id. at 171, to ordinary prison-mail delivery, the FBI to send notice of forfeiture to a prisoner
in such a manner that the prison staff would ensure the prisoner opened it, since doing so would not
“substantially improve[],” id. at 172, the likelihood of actual notice over the delivery system used at the
time of service).

19.

See 1 Robert C. Casad et al., Jurisdiction in Civil Actions § 1.01, at 8–9 (4th ed. 2014); see also
Process, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining “process” as “[a] summons or writ,
esp[ecially] to appear or respond in court”); id. (“Process is so denominated because it proceeds or issues
forth in order to bring the defendant into court, to answer the charge preferred against him, and
signifies the writs or judicial means by which he is brought to answer.” (citation omitted)).
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service is complete, a court may exercise its adjudicatory authority over the dispute,
provided jurisdiction is established.20
The extent of action required to complete service correlates with the nature of the
suit and the amount in controversy.21 Ideally, a defendant will be handed notice in
person, which is often referred to as “personal service,” but when this is not possible, a
plaintiff must resort to “alternate service.”22 At a minimum, when a defendant’s address
is known, a plaintiff must attempt to give notice through U.S. mail.23 However, when
a defendant’s address and whereabouts are unknown or inaccessible, plaintiffs may
resort to other forms of alternate service.24 These include service by affixture, 25

20. Casad et al., supra note 19, § 1.01, at 2. In addition to the notice requirements, to adjudicate a dispute,

a court must have the jurisdiction to do so. Id. There are two general components to jurisdiction: subject
matter jurisdiction, which pertains to a court’s ability to decide the legal issue before it, and personal or
territorial jurisdiction, which pertains to the court’s ability to bind the parties. See generally id. § 1.01[1]–
[2]. There are three types of personal jurisdiction: in personem jurisdiction, or jurisdiction over a named
defendant that provides the authority to adjudicate that defendant’s personal obligations arising from
the alleged conduct, id. § 1.01[2]; in rem jurisdiction, or jurisdiction over property within a state’s
territory that provides the authority to adjudicate title disputes over that property, id. § 1.01[3]; and
quasi in rem jurisdiction, which confers the authority to adjudicate title of a defendant’s property lying
within a state’s territory as partial compensation for the alleged conduct. Id.
At one point, in personem jurisdiction could only be obtained if a defendant was personally served
within the forum state. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720, 733 (1877). However, the Court
repudiated this doctrine in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, when it allowed for “long-arm”
jurisdiction by which defendants can be held liable within a forum state, to the extent that their actions
affect individuals within that state in a legally cognizable manner, if they have sufficient “minimum
contacts” within that state. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).

21.

See Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 115 (1956).

22.

See id. at 116; Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315, 317; Casad et al., supra note 19, § 1.01[2][b]; Personal Service,
Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining “personal service” as “[a]ctual delivery of the notice
or process to the person to whom it is directed” and stating that it is “[a]lso termed actual service”);
Service, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining “constructive service” as “[s]ervice
accomplished by a method or circumstance that does not give actual notice”). The phrase “constructive
service” is sometimes used interchangeably with the phrase “substituted service,” however the latter is
also used to refer to delivery upon an individual other than the named defendant, such as an individual
of suitable age at the defendant’s residence. Casad et al., supra note 19, § 1.01[2][b]; see also David D.
Siegel, New York Practice § 71, at 119 (5th ed. 2011) (noting the phrase “substituted service” can
“confuse[] matters” because it “is sometimes used to refer to any method of summons service other than
personal delivery”). To avoid confusion, this note uses the phrase “alternate service” to refer to all
methods of service other than those involving personal delivery to an individual.

23.

See Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983); Walker, 352 U.S. at 116; Mullane,
339 U.S. at 318–19.

24.

See, e.g., Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315, 317.

25.

See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(4) (McKinney 2017) (allowing alternate service “by affixing the summons
to the door of either the [defendant’s] actual place of business, dwelling place or usual place of abode . . .
and by . . . mailing the summons to [the defendant] at his or her last known residence . . . within twenty
days”).
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publication, 26 telex, 27 facsimile, 28 and recently, e-mail 29 and social media.30
26. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 316–17. In fact, at least one court has allowed online publication. Compare

Microsoft Corp. v. Does, No. 12-CV-1335 (SJ)(RLM), 2012 WL 5497946, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13,
2012) (permitting service by e-mail and Internet publication where the defendants’ whereabouts and
identities were unknown, in an action for injunctive relief and damages for the alleged use of malware),
with MLO v. “Younglawyer,” No. 506175/2014, 2015 WL 1597530, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 2, 2015)
(rejecting service by online publication on a message board in response to anonymous defendants’
allegedly tortious comments, even though service through e-mail was unavailable, because there was no
indication that the defendants would become aware of such posts and also because no monetary relief
could be accorded with the defendants’ identities unknown, and injunctive relief to prevent further
harm unlikely). See generally Lauren A. Rieders, Note, Old Principles, New Technology, and the Future of
Notice in Newspapers, 38 Hofstra L. Rev. 1009 (2010) (arguing that courts should permit notice by
publication in online newspapers).

27.

See New Eng. Merchs. Nat’l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission Co., 495 F. Supp. 73, 81
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Shultz, supra note 3, at 1504–05. The court in New England Merchants Nat’l Bank stated:
Courts . . . cannot be blind to changes and advances in technology. No longer do we live
in a world where communications are conducted solely by mail carried by fast sailing
clipper or steam ships. Electronic communication via satellite can and does provide
instantaneous transmission of notice and information. No longer must process be
mailed to a defendant’s door when he can receive complete notice at an electronic
terminal inside his very office, even when the door is steel and bolted shut.

495 F. Supp. at 81. Merriam-Webster defines “telex” as “a system of communication in which messages
are sent over long distances by using a telephone system and are printed by using a special machine
(called a teletypewriter).” Telex, Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
telex (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).
28. See Broadfoot v. Diaz (In re Int’l Telemedia Assocs., Inc.), 245 B.R. 713, 722 (N.D. Ga. Bankr. 2000)

(allowing service by e-mail); Aaron R. Chacker, Note, E-ffectuating Notice: Rio Properties v. Rio
International Interlink, 48 Vill. L. Rev. 597, 607–10 (2003).

29. Fisher v. Petr Konchalovsky Found., No. 15-cv-9831(AJN), 2016 WL 1047394 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10,

2016) (allowing service by e-mail to a Russian defendant upon a showing that e-mail was likely to reach
the defendant since he had responded to an e-mail concerning the subject matter of the dispute within
the past two months at the e-mail address, and also that service by other means would not suffice since
Russia had suspended judicial cooperation with the United States and objected to service by international
mail); Dama S.P.A. v. Does, No. 15-cv-4528 (VM), 2015 WL 10846737 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2015)
(permitting service by e-mail upon a defendant allegedly selling counterfeited goods through websites
based in China); AMTO, LLC v. Bedford Asset Mgmt., LLC, No. 14-CV-9913, 2015 WL 3457452,
at *7–10 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2015) (similar); Sulzer Mixpac AG v. Medenstar Indus. Co., 312 F.R.D.
329 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding that service by e-mail at a “contact” address listed on the defendant’s
website was reasonably calculated to provide actual notice and thus comported with due process and
international treaty); Phoenix-Dolezal v. Ni, No. 11 Civ. 3722(LAK)(JLC), 2012 WL 121105, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2012) (finding that service through e-mail and certified mail was proper); D.R.I.,
Inc. v. Dennis, No. 03 Civ. 10026(PKL), 2004 WL 1237511 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2004) (allowing service
by e-mail in addition to publication and certified mail sent to the defendant’s last known address); see In
re J.T., 37 N.Y.S.3d 846 (Fam. Ct. Sept. 2, 2016) (allowing service by e-mail in an action to terminate
the recipient-father’s parental rights where he had been deported to Jordan and had previously
communicated with the social worker via e-mail but failed to provide a physical address).

30. See Ferrarese v. Shaw, 164 F. Supp. 3d 361, 368 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (permitting service via Facebook,

e-mail, and certified mail to the defendant’s last known address in an action for, inter alia, parental
custody); FTC v. PCCare247 Inc., No. 12 Civ. 7189(PAE), 2013 WL 841037, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7,
2013) (permitting service by e-mail and Facebook upon international defendants allegedly engaged in
an Internet scheme to defraud American citizens); Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709 (Sup. Ct.

454

VOLUME 61 | 2016/17

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

Beyond the minimum required by due process, each jurisdiction within the
United States imposes its own statutory requirements that govern service of process.31
With respect to alternate service, some of these statutes contain catchall-type
provisions that allow courts to determine an effective manner of service when they
find that another will be futile.32 Through these catchall provisions, some courts
have allowed e-service.33
The first published opinion in which a court allowed e-service was In re
International Telemedia Associates, Inc. v. Diaz, where an international defendantdebtor had refused to provide a permanent address, but did provide a permanent
facsimile number and e-mail address.34 The court ordered service to be effected by
facsimile, e-mail, and regular mail to the defendant’s last known address.35
Subsequently, the court in Rio Properties v. Rio International Interlink allowed
service to be effected by e-mail upon an international defendant entity that could not
be served by conventional methods because its actual address was unascertainable.36
Noting that the defendant had structured its business so that it could only be reached
by e-mail, the court found that service by e-mail comported with both the Constitution
and rule 4(f)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Federal Rules”).37 Nevertheless,
the court noted that e-mail service has three shortcomings: (1) there is usually no way
to confirm receipt, (2) system compatibility issues could lead to disputes over whether
an attachment was actually received, and (3) attaching certain documents may be
2015) (discussing e-service generally, addressing the potential problems with service via social media,
and permitting service to be made solely by Facebook after noting the futility of service by publication).
31.

Alyssa L. Eisenberg, Comment, Keep Your Facebook Friends Close and Your Process Server Closer: The
Expansion of Social Media Service of Process to Cases Involving Domestic Defendants, 51 San Diego L. Rev.
779 app. a (2014). Statutory approval of the particular method of alternate service is a prerequisite to
obtaining in personam jurisdiction over a defendant thereby. See 62B Am. Jur. 2d Process § 134 (2017).

32.

Typical of these provisions is rule 308(5) of the CPLR, which states that “service upon a natural person”
may be made “in such manner as the court, upon motion without notice, directs, if service is impracticable
under paragraphs one, two and four of this section.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(5) (McKinney 2017).

33.

See supra notes 30–31; infra notes 48–51; cf., e.g., Am. Heritage Int’l, Inc. v. Sarabi, No. 2:15-cv-00101GMN-CWH, 2015 WL 6501129, at *2 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Oct. 27, 2015) (finding that rule 4 of the
Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, which contains no catchall provision, does not allow service by
electronic means).

34. 245 B.R. 713, 715–18 (N.D. Ga. Bankr. 2000); see Colby, supra note 3, at 356–60.
35.

Int’ l Telemedia Assocs., Inc., 245 B.R. at 718–19. As statutory authority, the International Telemedia
Associates court relied on rule 4(f)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, id. at 719–21, which
provides that service may be made on a foreign individual “by other means not prohibited by international
agreement[, as the court orders].” Id. at 719 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3)).

36. 284 F.3d 1007, 1013, 1016 (9th Cir. 2002). In Rio Properties, the plaintiff was unable to serve the

defendant at the address listed on its trademark application because that address housed only its
international courier, which was not authorized to accept service, and the plaintiff could not determine
the defendant’s Costa Rican address after searching international directory databases, but was able to
uncover the defendant’s e-mail address. Id. at 1012–13. The plaintiff attempted service through the
defendant’s international courier and Los Angeles attorney. Id. at 1013. See Chacker, supra note 28, for
a detailed discussion of Rio Properties.

37.

Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1017–18.
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impossible because of imprecise imaging technology.38 Despite these shortcomings, the
court affirmed the use of e-mail to effect service and acknowledged that district courts
will need to balance benefits and drawbacks of e-mail use on a case-by-case basis.39
In New York, the court in Hollow v. Hollow became the first court to authorize
e-service under rule 308(5) of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR).40
There, a defendant in a divorce action had been living in a secure complex in Saudi
Arabia for over two years, and he had only been communicating with the plaintiff
through e-mail.41 The defendant’s employer, who controlled the complex, refused to
accept service on his behalf, and an international process server could have faced criminal
charges for attempting to leave notice with the security personnel.42 After concluding
that other methods of service would be impracticable, the court allowed e-service, in
combination with service through international registered and standard mail.43
The court in Snyder v. Alternate Energy Inc. followed suit, allowing e-service after
the plaintiff demonstrated that obtaining the defendant’s physical addresses was
impracticable and that he previously communicated with the defendant by e-mail.44
Once the plaintiff saw that the defendant was online regularly45 and received
notification that the defendant read the e-mails requesting his current address,46 the
court ordered the plaintiff to (1) send notice by e-mail on two consecutive dates bearing
the subject line, “LEGAL PAPERS OPEN ATTACHMENT IMMEDIATELY”;
(2) mail notice to the defendant’s last known addresses; and (3) call the defendant’s
mobile number to advise him of the attempts being made.47
From these cases, a pattern emerges: E-service is generally permitted if (1) the
court has the statutory authority to allow it;48 (2) the plaintiff shows that personal
38. Id. at 1018. The court also noted that there could be issues about whether electronic signatures would

comport with rules 4(a) and 11 of the Federal Rules. Id.

39.

Id. at 1018–19, 1023. Following Rio Properties, courts have both allowed and declined e-mail service on
an ad hoc basis. See Eisenberg, supra note 31, at 789 n.64.

40. 747 N.Y.S.2d 704 (Sup. Ct. 2002); Colby, supra note 3, at 366–67.
41.

Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 705.

42.

Id.

43.

Id. at 706–08.

44. 857 N.Y.S.2d 442, 443–44 (Civ. Ct. 2008). There, the plaintiff had found the defendant’s address

vacant, and was unable to obtain a current address after employing the marshal, subpoenaing the
defendant’s cellular provider, checking with the local post office, and searching court records. Id. at 445;
see also D.R.I., Inc. v. Dennis, No. 03 Civ. 10026(PKL), 2004 WL 1237511 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2004)
(allowing service by e-mail, in addition to mailing notice to the defendant’s last-known addresses with
return receipt requested and publishing notice in newspapers local to those addresses for four weeks,
after plaintiff ’s attempts to effect service at the last-known addresses were unsuccessful).

45.

The defendant’s screen name appeared on the plaintiff ’s AOL Messenger “buddy list” whenever the two
were simultaneously online. Snyder, 857 N.Y.S.2d at 444–45.

46. The plaintiff requested a “return receipt” for the e-mails sent to the defendant. Id. at 445.
47.

Id. at 449.

48. See 62B Am. Jur. 2d, supra note 31, § 134.
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service by other methods would be impracticable;49 (3) the plaintiff shows that the
e-mail address is reasonably reliable;50 and (4) e-service is used in conjunction with
49. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(5), 311(b) (McKinney 2017); see also Ferrarese v. Shaw, 164

F. Supp. 3d 361 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (finding that the plaintiff established the requisite impracticability to
justify e-service where the defendant had changed her name multiple times, personal delivery attempts
at her last known address failed, and multiple skip trace searches yielded no current address); AMTO,
LLC v. Bedford Asset Mgmt., LLC, No. 14-CV-9913, 2015 WL 3457452 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2015)
(permitting service by e-mail upon a Russian defendant where the suspension of judicial cooperation
with the United States made other methods of service unavailable); Transclick, Inc. v. Rantnetwork,
Inc., No. 11 Civ. 8171(LTS), 2013 WL 4015768, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2013) (vacating an order
permitting service by e-mail where the defendant demonstrated that his address was readily attainable
by a basic Internet search and where e-mail messages sent bore no indication that they pertained to legal
matters); D.R.I., Inc., 2004 WL 1237511 (finding impracticability established where personal service
attempts at addresses found by, inter alia, searching DMV records failed); Hollow v. Hollow, 747
N.Y.S.2d 704, 706 (Sup. Ct. 2002) (stating that “[a]lthough a showing of impracticability does not
require proof of due diligence or actual attempts to serve a party under each and every method prescribed
in CPLR 308, the movant will be required to make a competent showing as to the actual prior efforts
that were made to effect service” (citations omitted)); Snyder, 857 N.Y.S.2d at 446 (citing Franklin v.
Winard, 592 N.Y.S.2d 726 (App. Div. 1993), for the proposition that a plaintiff can make a showing of
impracticability through “diligent, albeit unsuccessful, efforts to obtain information regarding a
defendant’s current residence, business address or place of abode”).

50. Fisher v. Petr Konchalovsky Found., No. 15-cv-9831(AJN), 2016 WL 1047394 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2016)

(allowing service by e-mail to a Russian defendant upon a showing that e-mail was likely to reach the
defendant since within the past two months he had responded to an e-mail concerning the subject matter
of the dispute that was sent to the same e-mail address, and discussing cases where service by e-mail was
denied because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the e-mail address given was accurate or used by the
defendant); Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Veles Ltd., No. 06 CV 2988(GBD), 2007 WL 725412, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2007) (permitting service by e-mail upon corporations that routinely communicated
with customers via that e-mail address); Safadjou v. Mohammadi, 964 N.Y.S.2d 801, 803–04 (App. Div.
2013) (affirming a judgment awarding divorce and parental custody where service by e-mail was effected
upon the defendant at the e-mail addresses through which the defendant had previously communicated
with the plaintiff); In re J.T., 37 N.Y.S.3d 846, 849–50 (Fam. Ct. 2016) (allowing service by e-mail where
the defendant had been deported to Jordan and had previously communicated via e-mail but failed to
provide a physical address); see Nykcool A.B. v. Pac. Int’l Servs., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 3d 385, 391 (S.D.N.Y.
2014) (finding that service by e-mail to an e-mail address that was listed as a “Contact Us” e-mail address
on a website hyperlinked to the defendant’s personal website was not reasonably calculated to provide
actual notice, and directing service to be made upon the defendant’s attorney by e-mail); SEC v. China Ne.
Petrol. Holdings Ltd., 27 F. Supp. 3d 379, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (denying service by, inter alia, e-mail sent
to the defendant’s son where there was no indication that such an e-mail would reach the defendant);
Silverman v. Blackman, No. CV 13-1349 (JS)(ARL), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155779, at *5–6 (E.D.N.Y.
Oct. 30, 2013) (denying service by e-mail in an action for, inter alia, trespass damages upon a finding that
the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the defendant sought to be served was actually the named
defendant); Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., No. 11 Civ. 6608(JFK), 2012 WL 2086950, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012) (denying service by Facebook message and e-mail address listed on a Facebook
account where the plaintiff provided no evidence that the defendant accesses the Facebook account or even
that the account was indeed the defendant’s actual account); Ehrenfeld v. Salim a Bin Mahfouz, No. 04
Civ. 9641(RCC), 2005 WL 696769, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2005) (denying service by e-mail where there
was no showing that the defendant used the proffered e-mail address to exchange important business
information or for any purpose other than receiving miscellaneous requests for information); In re
Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc. v. Cid, No. 654211/12, 2013 WL 3724941 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 16, 2013)
(denying service via e-mail to e-mail addresses provided on bank account applications that the defendants
filled out in 2006 and 2009 because the plaintiffs failed to provide any information showing that the
e-mail addresses were still valid or active). But see SEC v. Lines, No. 07 Civ. 11387(DLC), 2009 WL
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other methods of alternate service, such as U.S. mail and publication, if available.51
III. THE TECHNOLOGY BEHIND E-SERVICE

E-mail and social media have become ubiquitous aspects of virtually every
American’s daily routine.52 However, because of the relatively low cost associated
with sending messages over the Internet, as well as the ability to send attachments
that run programs on a user’s computer when opened, these platforms are ideal
mediums through which criminals can engage in fraud, such as identity theft.53
“Spam” is the term given to unsolicited e-mails, which are often sent to thousands
of recipients at a time.54 It can pose threats to recipients in three forms: (1) solicitations
for fraudulent commercial products; (2) inducements to click on links to fraudulent
websites, known as “phishing”; and (3) attachments that contain malware.55 “Malware,”
3179503, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2009) (citing Mullane and finding that it was not necessary to demonstrate
that the defendant was known to use the e-mail address when his whereabouts were unknown).
51.

See Ferrarese, 164 F. Supp. 3d at 386 (permitting service via Facebook, e-mail, and certified mail to the
defendant’s last known address in an action for, inter alia, parental custody); FTC v. PCCare247 Inc.,
No. 12 Civ. 7189(PAE), 2013 WL 841037, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013) (permitting service by e-mail
and Facebook); Microsoft Corp. v. Does, No. 12-CV-1335 (SJ)(RLM), 2012 WL 5497946, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2012) (permitting service upon defendants by e-mail and Internet publication);
Phoenix-Dolezal v. Ni, No. 11 Civ. 3722(LAK)(JLC), 2012 WL 121105, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2012)
(finding that service through e-mail and certified mail was proper); Gurung v. Malhotra, 279 F.R.D.
215, 219–21 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (granting default judgment where service had been effected through
newspaper publication, certified mail, and e-mail to the defendant’s publicly available government
e-mail address despite the Indian government’s intervention in an attempt to challenge the sufficiency
of such service); D.R.I., Inc., 2004 WL 1237511, at *2 (allowing service by e-mail in addition to
publication and certified mail sent to the defendant’s last known address). But see Baidoo v. BloodDzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 715–16 (Sup. Ct. 2015) (allowing service by Facebook as the only method of
service after noting the futility of service by publication).

52.

See Andrew Perrin, Social Media Usage: 2005-2015, Pew Res. Ctr. (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.
pewinternet.org/2015/10/08/social-networking-usage-2005-2015 (indicating that, as of 2015, seventysix per cent of adult Internet users use social media); Aaron Smith, U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015, Pew
Res. Ctr. (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/01/us-smartphone-use-in-2015
(indicating that eighty-eight per cent of smartphone owners surveyed used e-mail at least once a week).

53.

Harry Henderson, Encyclopedia of Computer Science and Technology 238 (rev. ed. 2009); id.
at 451 (“The fundamental driving force of spam is the fact that, given one has Internet access, sending
e-mail costs essentially nothing, no matter how many messages are sent. Thus even if only a tiny number
of people respond . . . the result is almost pure profit for the spammer.”).

54. See id. at 450–51 (noting that the term “spam” was likely coined in reference to a popular Monty Python

sketch in which a group of Vikings use the word “spam” in an absurdly repetitious manner); Spam: What
Is Spam?, Spam Laws, http://www.spamlaws.com/what-is-spam.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).
Estimates suggest that spam e-mails comprise anywhere from 45%–73% of all e-mails sent, while only
2.5% of spam e-mails consist of scams and fraud, with 73% of those being attempts at identity theft. Spam
Statistics and Facts, Spam Laws, http://www.spamlaws.com/spam-stats.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).

55.

Henderson, supra note 53, at 451. This note is concerned with the lattermost threat, although the
fraudulent e-service messages may also take the form of phishing attacks, for example where the
recipient is directed to a fraudulent court website that will ask for personal information. See infra text
accompanying notes 69–70.
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short for “malicious software,” includes computer viruses and worms.56 Often these
arrive in the form of a “Trojan Horse” (“Trojan”), a seemingly legitimate file that, when
opened, installs malware on a user’s computer.57 Spammers will compose messages that
trick recipients into opening the Trojan either by threatening or inciting them, usually
suggesting that the recipient must act immediately to secure a financial gain or to
prevent imminent harm.58
Once installed, the malware can perform a variety of functions. For example, a
form of malware known as “spyware” can covertly scan a computer’s hard drive in
search of personal information and send the information back to the source after
creating a “backdoor.”59 Some spyware can also record keystrokes in an attempt to
retrieve a user’s passwords and other information.60 Further, malware can secretly
hijack a user’s computer to access other computers on the same network, or use that
computer as a platform from which further spam attacks can be carried out.61
To counteract these threats, there are three common methods of scanning e-mails
and their attachments for malware: (1) heuristics-based detection, which looks for
words and phrases typically used in spam and phishing attacks; (2) signature-based
detection and blacklisting, which searches for known malware code or untrustworthy
IP addresses; and (3) behavioral detection, which observes how a program will
operate before it is opened.62

56. Erin F. MacLean & Deborah M. Micu, Internal Office Practices Can Make or Break a Law Firm’s

Cybersecurity, Mont. Law., Dec./Jan. 2015, at 16, 25. A “virus” is a program that automatically
reproduces itself throughout a user’s hard drive, whereas a “worm” will exploit existing f laws in a
computer’s network without reproducing itself. Henderson, supra note 53, at 110–11; see also Types of
Malware, Spam Laws, http://www.spamlaws.com/malware-types.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).

57.

See Types of Malware, supra note 56.

58. How Do I Know if It Is Spam?, Spam Laws, http://www.spamlaws.com/learn-how-to-identify-spam.

html (last visited Apr. 6, 2017). For discussions about phishing and other forms of identity theft in the
digital age, see Jennifer Lynch, Note, Identity Theft in Cyberspace: Crime Control Methods and Their
Effectiveness in Combating Phishing Attacks, 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 259 (2005), and J. Anthony Vittal,
Phishing, Pharming, and Other Scams, GPSolo, Dec. 2005, at 26.

59.

See Spyware and Trojan Horses, Spam Laws, http://www.spamlaws.com/trojan-horse.html (last visited
Apr. 6, 2017). This could be especially disastrous for law firms, considering the amount of confidential
and sensitive information that would become exposed.

60. See Avoiding Keystroke Loggers, Spam Laws, http://www.spamlaws.com/keystroke-loggers.html (last

visited Apr. 6, 2017).

61.

John Markoff, Attack of the Zombie Computers Is Growing Threat, N.Y. Times (Jan. 7, 2007), http://www.
nytimes.com/2007/01/07/technology/07net.html.

62. See Ted Green, Greenview Data, Inc., How URL Spam Filtering Beats Bayesian/Heuristics

Hands Down 4–5 (2005), https://www.greenviewdata.com/library/white-papers/spam-url-filteringvs-bayesian-heuristics.pdf; Lenny Zeltser, How Antivirus Software Works: Virus Detection Techniques,
SearchSecurity (Oct. 11, 2011), http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/tip/How-antivirus-softwareworks-Virus-detection-techniques.
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However, none of these methods would be foolproof against fraudulent e-service
messages.63 Heuristic-based detection would likely be ineffective because the body of
the message will usually be indistinguishable from a legitimate e-service message.64
Signature-based detection and blacklisting would fail to identify attacks from
unknown sources using previously unwritten code.65 Finally, behavioral detection is
limited in that certain behaviors, such as identifying keystrokes, would not be
enough, on their own, to trigger filtration.66
E-service messages thus provide an ideal template for phishing attacks. A
legitimate e-service message could come from an unknown e-mail address and
contain an attachment that urges the recipient to act immediately.67 A savvy spammer
could easily send thousands of e-mails purporting to be e-service messages, address
each one individually, and make them appear to have come from a legitimate sender.68
If the malware goes undetected, there would be no way to differentiate between a
legitimate e-service message and a spam attack.
Indeed, this practice has already begun. Today, spam attacks take the form of a
“court notice” e-mail, whereby recipients are told that they must appear in a particular
court on a given day, and that they should either open an explanatory attachment or
call a listed telephone number.69 In New York, for instance, this problem became so
pervasive that the official website for the New York State Unified Court System now
contains an advisory warning about the illegitimacy of such e-mails.70 Unfortunately,
63. See Henderson, supra note 53, at 451 (stating that, because of the relentless battle between spammers

and spam-fighters, perhaps the only way to prevent spam altogether is through an Internet-wide
authentication of e-mail users).

64. Green, supra note 62, at 5–6; see id. at 6 (noting that “[h]euristic systems are unsuitable for some

industries like medicine and law”).

65.

See id. at 4; Zeltser, supra note 62.

66. See Zeltser, supra note 62.
67.

See sources cited supra note 58.

68. See Henderson, supra note 53, at 370; How Spam Works, Spam Laws, http://www.spamlaws.com/how-

spam-works.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).

69. See Court Summons Scam Emails Carry Malware, Better Bus. Bureau (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.bbb.

org/upstatesc/news-events/bbb-scam-alerts/2014/09/court-summons-scam-emails-carry-malware.

70. Important Notice About “Scam” Emails Involving Notices to Appear, NYCourts.gov, https://www.

nycourts.gov/contactus/scamemails.shtml (last visited Apr. 6, 2017). The notice reads:

It has come to our attention that scam emails, purporting to be coming from the
New York State Court System, directing recipients to report to court and to open an
attachment for more information, are infecting recipients’ computers with a virus.
These scam emails typically instruct recipients to report to court on a specific day
and time, and they often direct the recipient to bring documents and witnesses with
them. They also typically warn that the court may proceed in their absence and that
they will be sanctioned if they do not appear. The emails also instruct recipients to read
a court notice that is attached. The attachment contains a computer virus. Do not open
the attachment. Delete the email.
Be on the alert, if you are not involved in a court proceeding and have not supplied
the [New York] courts with an email address for receiving court notifications, the
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this advisory warning only addresses e-mails purporting to come from the court
itself, and not those purporting to come from parties or their attorneys, as a fraudulent
e-service message would.
IV. THE LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF FAILING TO DOWNLOAD AN E-SERVICE
ATTACHMENT

Consider the following scenario: A worried client pays her attorney a visit after
receiving an e-mail with the subject line “Important: Legal Notice ***DO NOT
IGNORE***.” The message appears to have come from “Smith Law Firm,” and it
tells her to open an attached document labeled “Summons and Complaint.” It
provides no court information, let alone any indication of what state or county the
supposed action was brought in. Should she be advised to open the attachment? If
the e-mail is legitimate, has she properly been brought under the jurisdiction of the
court? If she ignores the e-mail, might she face a default judgment that cannot be
vacated? Finally, after considering all risks, what would the “reasonably prudent
person” do under these circumstances?
A. Default Judgments in General

If the e-mail is legitimate and the client ignores it, the primary legal threat facing
her would be a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff. A plaintiff who claims a
legally cognizable cause of action will be entitled to a default judgment against a
defendant who does not appear after being served with process.71 A defendant
seeking to vacate a default judgment must move to do so before the court that entered
the judgment.72 Otherwise, a plaintiff may enforce the judgment for up to twenty
years after the date of entry.73
To assess the client’s situation, the attorney must consider whether a court would
vacate a default judgment resulting from the purported e-service message. After all,
if the judgment could be vacated easily, there is little reason for her to risk identity
theft by opening the e-mail attachment, since she would be able to safely await a
default judgment as proof of its legitimacy and defend herself thereafter. Conversely,

courts do not communicate with you by email. The court system does not send
unsolicited emails or requests for personal information. The court system does not send
emails threatening sanctions if you do not appear in court. Nor does the court system
send emails that ask you to open attachments in order to obtain additional information.

Id. (emphasis omitted). The Better Business Bureau issued a similar advisory. Scam Alert—You’re On
Trial? Watch Out for This Email Scam, Better Bus. Bureau (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.bbb.org/
council/news-events/bbb-scam-alerts/2014/03/scam-alert-youre-on-trial-watch-out-for-this-emailscam.
71.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3215 (McKinney 2017).

72. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); C.P.L.R. 5015(a).
73. Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1) (providing that the forum state’s procedure will govern execution of a money

judgment); C.P.L.R. 211(b).
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if a swift vacatur74 cannot be assured, then perhaps it would behoove her to open the
attachment and hope that her computer’s security can ward off the virus.
B. Relief Due to Lack of Jurisdiction

Under both the Federal Rules and the New York CPLR, a defendant may seek
relief from a judgment at any time for lack of jurisdiction.75 Jurisdiction does not
exist where a plaintiff did not serve the defendant as required by law or where a court
does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.76 Further, a defendant
seeking relief for lack of jurisdiction need not assert a meritorious defense to the
underlying claim because, as a constitutional imperative, a judgment entered without
jurisdiction is a nullity.77
Unfortunately, this argument would likely not help the client if the e-service
message were legitimate. Pending an unlikely determination that e-service does not
comport with due process78 or that the court did not have the authority to order it,79 the
e-service message would be sufficient to subject her to the court’s personal jurisdiction.80
Indeed, this would be true even if she could ultimately prove that she never saw the
e-mail, because the Constitution does not require actual notice of the action.81
C. Relief Due to Fraud

A defendant may also move to vacate a judgment by showing that the plaintiff
engaged in fraud.82 Under the Federal Rules, defendants must assert these grounds
within one year of the judgment’s entry.83 However, the CPLR allows defendants to

74.

Vacatur, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining “vacatur” as “[t]he act of annulling or
setting aside” or “[a] rule or order by which a proceeding is vacated”).

75. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4); C.P.L.R. 5015(a)(4).
76. See 1 David L. Ferstendig, Weinstein, Korn & Miller CPLR Manual § 3.01, at 3-3 (3d ed.

2015). See generally id. § 3.02 (explaining subject matter jurisdiction). For “subject matter jurisdiction”
defined, see supra note 20.

77.

See Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80 (1988); Gager v. White, 425 N.E.2d 851 (N.Y. 1981).
In practice, it is best to move for relief in the alternative—by asserting either that no personal jurisdiction
was obtained in the first place, or that if personal jurisdiction was obtained, the defendant has an excuse
for the delay and a meritorious defense. See Siegel, supra note 22, § 108, at 202–03.

78. See supra notes 13–30 and accompanying text.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 30 –33.
80. See supra notes 29–30, 52, and accompanying text. Of course, this assumes that the hypothetical plaintiff

asserted an appropriate jurisdictional basis over the client. See supra note 20.

81.

All that is required is a step “reasonably calculated” to provide actual notice. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover
Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).

82. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5015(a)(3) (McKinney 2017).
83. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).
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assert these grounds at any time,84 and the defendant need not assert a meritorious
defense to the underlying action.85 In both jurisdictions, when a plaintiff lies to the
court when requesting permission to resort to alternate service, such as by
mischaracterizing or fabricating the attempts taken to effect in-person service, the
fraud provides grounds for vacatur.86
Thus, if the plaintiff lied to the court about the steps taken to attempt service by
other methods, and those lies are uncovered on a motion to vacate the judgment, the
client would likely succeed under both the Federal Rules and the CPLR. However,
there is an obvious practical difficulty: she might have to disprove the plaintiff ’s
assertions long after the fact. Fortunately, estimating the degree of difficulty is fairly
straightforward. If she has been residing in the same location for a long time, a court
is less likely to believe that the plaintiff actually made the attempts alleged (and she
should be expecting further notice to arrive in the mail).87 However, if she has
recently moved without leaving a forwarding address,88 or is otherwise transient,
there is a reasonable possibility that a court will believe a plaintiff ’s assertions about
the difficulty of effecting in-person service and service by mail. Thus, the safest
course of action for a client in this scenario might be to open the attachment.
D. Excusable Default

If the court were to believe the allegations supporting the plaintiff ’s original
motion for e-service—that other methods of service were attempted but
unsuccessful—then the client would need to assert “excusable default” as a ground
for the vacatur.
Owing to the potential severity of default judgments, both the Federal Rules and
the CPLR provide a statutory period allowing defendants to seek vacatur on the
basis of “excusable default” by asserting both a justification for the delay in appearing
84. Rule 5015(a)(3) of the CPLR does not contain a time limit. See C.P.L.R. 5015(a)(3); Wells Fargo Bank

N.A. v. Podeswik, 981 N.Y.S.2d 230 (App. Div. 2014).

85. See Tonawanda Sch. Emps. Fed. Credit Union v. Zack, 662 N.Y.S.2d 885 (App. Div. 1997).
86. See, e.g., Shaw v. Shaw, 467 N.Y.S.2d 231, 233–35 (App. Div. 1983) (holding that a motion to vacate

under rule 5015(c) of the CPLR based on “extrinsic fraud”—which prevents parties from fully and fairly
representing themselves—need not be supported by a meritorious defense, analogizing it to a motion
based on lack of jurisdiction owing to improper service, and differentiating extrinsic fraud from “sewer
service”—where the fraud is made upon the court to conceal that no proper service has been made—
although characterizing both as “fraud” and not “ jurisdictional” per se).

87.

See Transclick, Inc. v. Rantnetwork, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 8171(LTS), 2013 WL 4015768, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 7, 2013) (vacating an order permitting e-mail service, where the defendant demonstrated that his
address was readily attainable by a basic Internet search and where e-mail messages sent bore no
indication that they pertained to legal matters).

88. See D.R.I., Inc. v. Dennis, No. 03 Civ. 10026(PKL), 2004 WL 1237511 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2004)

(finding impracticability established where personal service attempts at addresses found by, inter alia,
searching DMV records failed); Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 711–12, 716 (Sup. Ct. 2015)
(finding that the defendant’s failure to provide a forwarding address to the post office supported a
finding of impracticability and justified resorting to service by Facebook).
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and a meritorious defense to the underlying action.89 Courts analyze the justification
given for the delay on an ad hoc basis, often considering the length of delay, the
reason for the default, and the prejudice that would result to the plaintiff if the
motion were granted.90 The Federal Rules require that this motion be made within
one year of entry of the judgment,91 and the CPLR requires that it be made within
one year after notice of the judgment was served.92
Unlike the Federal Rules, the CPLR has a special provision for defendants who
are served by a method other than personal delivery: Rule 317 states that if the court
finds that the defendant did not receive actual notice, relief may be sought within
one year of learning of the judgment, but not more than five years after its entry.93
When this basis is relied on, the defendant need not assert any justification for the
delay, but must still assert a meritorious defense.94
When considering the possibility of obtaining a vacatur for “excusable delay,”
there are time limits to consider. Under the Federal Rules, if the client fails to notice
the default judgment for over a year after it is entered, she will be barred from
asserting this defense. Under the CPLR, she could await notice of the judgment, but
she would need to act within one year.95 In both jurisdictions, she would have to
assert a meritorious defense to the underlying cause of action. However, even if she
responds on time and offers a meritorious defense, she would still be at a judge’s
mercy on the issue of whether her delay was justified, and so determining her
likelihood of success would be difficult.
The alternate grounds for relief under rule 317 of the CPLR seem inapplicable to
the client’s situation. No court has addressed the issue of whether receipt of an e-mail,
without opening the attached summons, would qualify as “actual notice” for the
purposes of this rule. However, given the obvious analogy to receiving a letter but
never opening the envelope, it seems unlikely—although certainly debatable—that
she would succeed in maintaining that she did not receive “actual notice” of the action

89. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1); C.P.L.R. 5015(a)(1); see 2 Ferstendig, supra note 76, § 24.05[b][1], at 24-24

to -25.

90. See 2 Ferstendig, supra note 76, § 24.05[b][1], at 24-24 n.5.
91.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).

92.

C.P.L.R. 5015(a)(1).

93.

Id. at 317. This provision is distinct from, and imposes no limitation on, the various grounds for relief
available under rule 5015 of the CPLR. See Ariowitsch v. Johnson, 498 N.Y.S.2d 891, 893 (App. Div.
1986). Therefore, a defendant may assert lack of jurisdiction as a ground for relief at any time regardless
of whether rule 317 would be available. Id.

94. Ariowitsch, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 893. However, this provision is unavailable in actions for divorce, annulment,

or partition. C.P.L.R. 317.

95. Under New York law, she will still be able to resort to the court’s discretionary authority to vacate

judgment. See infra Part IV.E.

464

VOLUME 61 | 2016/17

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

simply because she did not open the e-mail.96 Therefore, there is an appreciable risk
that she would not be given the ability to defend on the merits that rule 317 provides.
E. Discretionary Relief

Under rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules, a federal court may grant relief from a
judgment for “any other reason that justifies relief,”97 as long as it is requested within
a “reasonable time” after entry.98 However, a defendant may not use this provision to
circumvent the time limits of the other grounds for relief, since this provision is
exclusive of those grounds.99 Therefore, where a defendant is asserting excusable
default or fraud, this provision is unavailable.100
New York courts have broader discretion, since they retain the inherent authority
to vacate their own judgments at any time if doing so is in the interest of substantial
justice.101 Unlike the Federal Rules, the New York courts’ discretion is in addition to
their statutory authority; thus, defendants have a safety net if they must rely on
grounds for which the statutory time period has elapsed or if they are unable to
excuse a delay in seeking relief.102
Therefore, in federal court, rule 60(b)(6) would be of little use to the client. Since
the Federal Rules consider this authority to be exclusive of the other statutory
grounds for relief, her only available argument under this provision is that relief
would be justified simply because of the unusual form of notice.103 The likelihood of
succeeding on this argument will vary depending, for example, on whether the
details offered in the e-mail body supported an assumption of spam or legitimacy,
the particular judge’s philosophy on e-service and the Internet generally, and how
common e-service had become by the time she received the message. Again, this
provides no clear solution for the client.
96. Cf. Bennett v. Patel Catskills, LLC, 990 N.Y.S.2d 594, 595 (App. Div. 2014) (determining that the fact

that the summons sent via certified mail was returned as “unclaimed” raised a triable issue of fact as to
whether the defendant received notice). The negative ramifications of allowing a recipient to succeed on
this argument are palpable. One could easily negate an otherwise valid e-service attempt by simply
refusing to open the e-mail. Nevertheless, valid reasons for nonreceipt of e-mail might include that the
message was routed into a “ junk” mail folder or that it was sent to an outdated e-mail address. In those
instances, a defendant might be able to prove that notice was never received, although obtaining
evidence years later might be difficult.

97.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).

98. Id. at 60(c)(1).
99. Wesco Prods. Co. v. Alloy Auto. Co., 880 F.2d 981, 983 (7th Cir. 1989).
100. Id.
101. See Woodson v. Mendon Leasing Corp., 790 N.E.2d 1156, 1160 (N.Y. 2003); 1 Ferstendig, supra note

76, § 24.05[a].

102. See Piatt v. Horsley, 970 N.Y.S.2d 155 (App. Div. 2013); McMahon v. City of New York, 483 N.Y.S.2d

228 (App. Div. 1984).

103. Other available arguments, such as lack of jurisdiction, fraud, and excusable delay, would have to be

considered under the other provisions of rule 60 of the Federal Rules, and thus be subject to the
applicable time limits.
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However, under New York law, the client would be able to seek relief from any
judgment obtained, since New York courts retain inherent authority to do so. Even
so, there is no guarantee that a court would agree to vacate the judgment, and so the
best attorneys can do is predict the most likely outcome. Unfortunately, without
opening the attachment to evaluate the underlying facts, the attorney would have no
way to even speculate about the potential prejudice that might be in store for the
plaintiff if the client ignores the e-mail. Thus, while the mere existence of this
discretionary authority might provide some comfort for the client if she decides to
ignore the e-mail altogether, it still fails to resolve the dilemma completely; there
remains a risk that the judgment will not be vacated.
F. Resulting Policy Implications

Again, what would the “reasonably prudent person” do in this circumstance?
Even if the client has maintained the same permanent residence for many years,
there is a small possibility that the e-mail is legitimate and that the plaintiff has lied
about attempting traditional methods of service, hoping to obtain a default judgment
without her knowledge.104 Further, if the client has recently moved, the possibility
that the e-mail is legitimate increases, especially if she did not provide a forwarding
address to the post office.105 It would be helpful, especially in the latter case, to know
more about the purported cause of action before deciding whether to open the
attachment. For instance, she might be able to identify the plaintiff as someone she
associated with prior to switching residences or find other useful information in the
complaint. Unfortunately, without opening the attachment, there would be no way
to conduct this investigation. In either scenario, there is no guarantee that the client
would be able to vacate a resulting judgment, and, at the very least, attempting to do
so would likely impose certain expenses that she would not otherwise incur, such as
hiring an attorney.
The situation is made worse by two additional factors. First, given the relative
infrequency with which e-service is used, it is more likely for the message to be
fraudulent than legitimate. However, a default judgment might be even more
104. See Siegel, supra note 22, § 71, at 117; supra note 86 (discussing “sewer service,” where the process

server swears to service having been completed when none was ever attempted). For example, a debtcollector could have a legitimate cause of action against the client, but be reluctant to hire a reputable
process server. See Service, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining “sewer service” as “[t]he
fraudulent service of process on a debtor by a creditor seeking to obtain a default judgment”); Default
Judgments, Gutter Service and the Statute of Limitations, Hub Pages (Feb. 10, 2011), http://hubpages.
com/money/Default-Judgments-Gutter-Service-and-the-Statute-of-Limitations; see also Pandiscia v.
Pandiscia, No. 321/2012, 9 N.Y.S.3d 594, 2014 WL 7530334, at *2 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 22, 2014)
(unpublished table decision) (“‘[S]ewer service’ . . . occurs ‘when a process server discards court papers
and claims they were duly served, recording a fictitious date and time of service in the log and in the
court affidavits of service.’” (quoting First Commercial Bank of Memphis, N.A. v. Ndiaye, 733 N.Y.S.2d
562, 564 (Sup. Ct. 2001))).

105. See Snyder v. Alternate Energy Inc., 857 N.Y.S.2d 442, 448–49 (Civ. Ct. 2008) (finding that the

plaintiffs established impracticability of serving the defendant because, inter alia, they were not able to
locate a forwarding address at the local post office).
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problematic than malware for the average recipient, especially if it cannot be vacated.
Second, those recipients who are less technologically inclined, and thus less likely to
have effective malware detection software, are more susceptible to such scams.
Therefore, the existence of e-service alone creates both legal and practical
obligations for e-mail users to open an attachment from an unknown source. While
the chance that a given message is legitimate will vary depending on the recipient’s
circumstances, there is no way for any individual to know for sure. This exposes
individuals’ sensitive information, and can punish e-mail users for being cautious
about their legal rights.
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

From the above discussion, three points should be evident. First, there is no
uniform way that e-service must be accomplished.106 While it would be possible for a
court to require the body of the e-service message to include helpful information
about the court and claims alleged, it is not currently required. As a result, a
legitimate e-service message might contain no information explaining the attachment,
and so the recipient of a generic e-service message cannot safely disregard it.
Second, while e-mail and social media are ideal methods for reaching an elusive
defendant who nevertheless maintains an online presence, those same platforms also
serve as ideal mediums for fraud and identity theft.107 Further, as e-service becomes
more widely accepted, recipients of e-service messages will be more likely to believe
they are legitimate and open the potentially harmful attachments.
Third, a recipient of a legitimate e-service message may be unable to vacate a
resulting judgment, especially if the plaintiff was honest about her attempts to effect
service by traditional means.108 Even if they are not barred from obtaining a vacatur,
recipients pursuing this relief may face practical difficulties that become greater with
time. For instance, to prove that one did not receive notice is to prove a negative, and
it could be difficult to demonstrate that the efforts outlined by a plaintiff to initially
justify e-service were not actually attempted.109
Thus, in its current state, e-service creates a fertile environment for spam attacks
purporting to contain service of process. If left unattended, this environment will
only get worse as e-service becomes more routine.110 However, there are ways to
mitigate the risks while leaving intact the availability of e-service to plaintiffs who
are frustrated by an elusive defendant, although each of the possibilities suffers from
its own set of limitations.
One solution is to create a standard format for e-service messages to follow that
would allow recipients to remotely verify that they are indeed named in a pending
106. See supra text accompanying notes 34–51.
107. See supra Part III.
108. See supra Part IV.E.
109. See supra Part IV.C–D.
110. See supra pp. 460–61.
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action, not just targets of a spam attack. This requirement would provide certainty to
recipients, since they could safely disregard any message without the requisite
information. Perhaps the simplest, and most effective, method would be to require
all e-service messages to contain, in the message body or subject line, a document
identifier that will allow the recipient to search for the court filings independently.111
The most readily available identifier would be an index number, which would be
given to plaintiffs when they file the complaint.112 By providing the index number, in
addition to any other information required to search for the filings,113 all the recipient
would have to do is look up the index number and read the corresponding documents.
One shortcoming of this approach, however, is that spammers might attempt to
create their own fraudulent means of “verifying” the message. A spammer might
compose a message that follows the same general format as a legitimate e-service
message, and directs recipients to a fraudulent website.114 However, so long as a
plaintiff is required to provide a specific type of document identifier, a recipient
would, at the least, be able to confer with counsel before visiting the website and
thereby be advised against doing so. This approach, of course, is of little help to
those who are not computer savvy, or have no means of retaining counsel or verifying
court documents.
Another possibility is to have courts send the messages via a central server.115 At
first glance, this would seem to reduce the threat of spam by allowing individuals to
simply check the sender’s information to confirm legitimacy. However, there are
several problems with this proposal. First, courts do not typically take responsibility
for effecting service on behalf of a plaintiff.116 Second, this would require courts to
devote their limited resources to creating an e-mail server and assigning personnel to
compose and send such e-mails. Finally, spammers routinely “mask” their true e-mail
111. Individuals can search for a case by entering their name into the search field and checking if they are

named as defendants in a pending action. See WebCivil Supreme—Case Search, N.Y. St. Unified Ct.
Sys., https://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/webcivil/FCASSearch (last visited Apr. 6, 2017). However, this
still does not alert individuals to whether the e-mail is legitimate, and the task could be arduous for
individuals with fairly common last names. Further, this option is unavailable for some local courts. See
WebCivil Local—Available Courts, N.Y. St. Unified Ct. Sys., https://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/
webcivilLocal/LCAvailableCourts (last visited Apr. 6, 2017). Thus, providing court information and an
index number, which would enable direct inquiry, is a better solution.

112. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 306-a (McKinney 2017).
113. In New York, for example, one would also need the name of the court and county to conduct the

necessary search by index number. See, e.g., WebCivil Supreme—Case Search, supra note 111.

114. See Henderson, supra note 53, at 369–70.
115. The Colorado court system accepts filings through an integrated court filing system; however, it

specifically excludes personal service of process and applies only to service of pleadings and other
documents subsequent to the originating documents upon parties who have already registered for the
system. Colo. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(D); ICCES User Agreement—Terms and Conditions of Use, Integrated
Colo. Cts. E-Filing Sys. 6, https://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/file/terms.pdf (last updated May
11, 2015).

116. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2) (“Any person who is at least 18 years old and not a party may serve a summons

and complaint.”).
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address to make it appear that the message is coming from someone else.117 Thus,
this solution might be counterproductive by providing a “mask” that spammers know
will be effective.118
Yet another solution is to allow e-service recipients to freely open judgments
obtained against them if they (1) do so within a reasonable time after learning of the
judgment, and (2) can establish ignorance of the underlying cause of action at the
time of receipt. The first requirement could be modeled after rule 317 of the CPLR,
which automatically allows defendants to open a judgment to defend on the merits if
they move to do so within the time requirements. This would prevent a legal
obligation to open an e-service attachment from being imposed on individuals who
are not truly evading service—the vast majority of Internet users—provided they
have no reason to suspect they are being sued. The second requirement would
encourage plaintiffs to include detailed information in the body of an e-service
message, thus facilitating a defendant’s inquiry into its legitimacy, since any
information provided will operate against the defendant’s claim of ignorance.
However, this option may create uncertainty for a plaintiff, since it threatens the
finality of a judgment obtained by e-service. Further, it would do nothing to address
the apparent legitimacy of fraudulent e-service messages, and would not provide a
way to determine, with certainty, whether an e-service message is legitimate. Thus,
for the unsuspecting recipient who does not seek the advice of counsel before opening
an attachment, this solution will provide no benefit.119
Finally, it may be helpful to establish uniformity among the circumstances for
which e-service is allowed. For instance, jurisdictions could statutorily limit e-service
to certain causes of action or require certain objective criteria to be met before
e-service may be used.120 Similar to the solution of requiring document identifiers to
be placed in e-service messages, this would allow a recipient to independently
determine whether there could be any legal consequences from not opening the
attachment. However, unlike an index number, this would not allow an individual to
guarantee, before opening the attachment, that an e-service message is legitimate; it
only provides them with the enhanced ability to calculate the probability that they
will face legal consequences if it actually is. Also, there is always the chance that an

117. See Henderson, supra note 53, at 370.
118. The same argument can be used against requiring a standard template for e-service messages that does

not include an independently verifiable document identifier. For example, the court in Snyder v.
Alternate Energy Inc. directed the e-service message to bear the subject line, “LEGAL PAPERS OPEN
ATTACHMENT IMMEDIATELY.” 857 N.Y.S.2d 442, 444 (Civ. Ct. 2008).

119. In contrast, if an e-mail contains an index number, recipients could consult the court’s website to

determine authenticity, which will spare them the expense of consulting an attorney.

120. For example, jurisdictions might limit e-service to defendants who are actively evading service or who

moved without leaving a forwarding address. To challenge jurisdiction after the fact, defendants could
simply offer evidence that they were not actively evading service or that they did leave a forwarding
address with a post office.
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individual recipient might meet the statutory criteria, but nevertheless open what
turns out to be a fraudulent attachment.121
Overall, any solution, even a limited one, would be better established by statute
than by case law. If courts continue to have unbridled discretion to allow e-service,
limited only by “due process,” there exists a possibility that a given judge will allow
e-service for different criteria than those routinely required by other judges. Further,
to establish binding precedent, it will be necessary for some individuals to bear the
expense of appeal to establish a standard for others. If not addressed by statute, until
a willing litigant steps forward, e-mail users everywhere will continue to be faced
with a dilemma when confronted with an apparent e-service message.
VI. CONCLUSION

While e-service is beneficial for those plaintiffs seeking to serve an elusive
defendant, it also enhances the apparent legitimacy of spam attacks that purport to
contain e-service. These attacks pose a unique risk to recipients because, under
current practice, e-service messages do nothing to distinguish themselves from spam.
Also, because the authority to allow e-service is largely discretionary, there are few
uniform rules to help someone determine, in advance of opening an attachment,
whether the e-mail is legitimate, and, if so, what the legal ramifications of ignoring
the message would be.
Among the solutions available, the simplest and most effective is to require all
e-service messages to provide an index number and jurisdictional information within
the body of the e-mail. This would allow recipients to conduct their own search to
confirm whether the e-mail is legitimate before they open any attachment. Another
useful solution would be to allow defendants to freely open a judgment obtained by
e-service as long as they do so within a certain amount of time after receiving notice
of the judgment and can establish ignorance of the underlying cause of action. This
will encourage plaintiffs to provide enough information in the body of an e-mail to
demonstrate to the recipient that the message is legitimate.
Fortunately, these options are not mutually exclusive. Though they are imperfect,
implementing them will enhance the benefits of e-service, and reduce the risks.

121. Since spammers routinely send e-mails to thousands of recipients, there is always a chance that at least

one recipient could satisfy the statutory criteria. See Henderson, supra note 53, at 370; How Spam
Works, supra note 68.
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